Abstract-In multicast transmission on the Internet, agents are divided into multicast groups based on the content they demand. In addition, when multi-rate transmission is used, each user in the same multicast group may request different quality of service for the same content. With multi-rate multicast transmission, each link on the network carries only the highest quality content of each multicast group passing through this link, thus resulting in substantial resource savings compared to unicast transmission. In this paper a mechanism is constructed that fully implements social welfare maximising allocation in Nash equilibria for the case of multi-rate multicast service under the assumption of strategic agents for whom utilities are private information. The emphasis of this work is on full implementation, which means that all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the induced game result in the optimal allocations of the centralised allocation problem. The mechanism, which is constructed in a quasi-systematic way starting from the dual of the centralized problem, has a number of additional useful properties. Specifically, the proposed mechanism results in feasible allocation (in fact in Pareto optimal allocation) even off-equilibrium. Finally, in the extended version of this paper it is shown how strong budget balance at equilibrium can be added to the proposed mechanism in a straightforward manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a general informationally (and physically) decentralised system, such as the Internet, in order to make protocols work, a designer would usually require dissemination of (local) information from agents within the system. In the presence of strategic agents, enforcing such protocols is significantly harder. Strategic agents are agents for whom utility-maximisation is the only goal and thus they can lie about their private information if it helps increase their utility. Presence of private information, relevant to working of a protocol, in the hands of strategic agents requires the designer to venture into the field of mechanism design. Mechanism design focuses on designing contracts which induce strategic agents to take actions that reveal (directly or indirectly) their relevant private information truthfully. Voting rules, auctions, private and public good exchange economies are a few examples of fields where economists have used mechanism design extensively.
Nash Implementation is a specific area within Mechanism design for which the requirements on the contract are more stringent. Here the contract should result in only the most preferred outcome at Nash equilibrium -in mechanism design generally other less preferred outcomes are also allowed. For implementation, readers may refers to survey article [1] where the discussion is in microeconomics context or one may refer to [2] , [3] for mechanism design review with networks and communications applications. Mechanism design for allocation of a single divisible good in Internet framework has been discussed in [4] , [5] , [6] , where implementation in general unicast and multicast has been discussed in [7] , [8] , [9] . All of the above as well as the work here uses Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. Nash equilibrium is generally used as a solution concept for complete information games and we discuss this aspect of modelling in Information assumptions (Section IV) and also in Discussion (Section V).
We consider the problem of multi-rate multicast service provisioning on the Internet, where on the same network, different services with varying QoS (rate) within the same service are provided. The main difference with unicast service is that here agents requesting the same service need not be serviced by establishing completely separate connections for each; at common links only connection for the agent with the highest rate will be established; thereby preventing duplication at that link. Our aim is to build a mechanism who's outcomes at Nash equilibria give only such allocation that maximises the sum of agents' utilities. Sharing of resources in multicast has a unique nature. Due to the capacity constraints on the links of the network, allocation of rate to one group of agents would necessarily mean that available rate for other groups reduces. However since capacity constraint is only dictated by the highest rate agent from each group, others in the group can be allocated some additional rate without having to affect anybody else. These represent private and public goods features in the multi-rate multicast network, respectively. In models without strategic users, researchers have investigated different rules for rate allocation. One example is the maxmin fairness for multicast used in [10] , [11] , [12] . We use sum of individual utilities over all agents as our measure for overall satisfaction. In [13] , [14] authors have used integer and convex programming to get decentralised algorithms that maximise this social objective. Allocation that maximises the sum of utilities can be shown to be Pareto optimal whenever money/tax is part of the utilities. Therefore we choose this criterion which will help prevent exchanging of allocated rates via a side market.
Auxiliary Properties of a Mechanism: To get better applicability for contracts in real world, we look for certain additional properties in a mechanism. Individual Rationality and Strong Budget Balance are two such popular properties. In this paper we will only discuss the Strong Budget Balance formulation (Section III), for full treatment with this property kindly refer to the technical report [15] . In this paper we focus on feasibility of allocation -on and off equilibrium, which is another very important property. A mechanism with such property ensures that the contract never promises allocations outside the feasible region (even off-equilibrium). Otherwise we might end up with a contract that makes false promises and is probably inapplicable in practice. In this work, we use proportional allocation to achieve the property of feasibility off-equilibrium. Proportional allocation refers to idea of using agents' demands to create their allocation by projecting (w.r.t. origin) their overall demand "vector" back down to the feasible region defined by the capacity constraints. This way everyone receives rate allocation that is proportional to their original demand. So irrespective of what actions agents choose to play, the contract would never promise to allocate rates above capacity. The communication system thus performs reliably even off-equilibrium; in fact with this the allocation is always on the boundary of the feasible region, system resources are utilised fully.
The work here generalises the idea of proportional allocation that was introduced in mechanism design framework by [5] , [6] for unicast network with only one capacity constraint and for stochastic control of networks by [16] . We emphasize, that in the context of this paper, proportional allocation is only used as a way to translate users' demands into actual allocations taking into account the capacity constraints. Additionally, readers may be refer to [7] for a full implementation mechanism that uses proportional allocation in the unicast framework. This is in contrast to [9] , where significant effort has been made to ensure budget balance off-equilibrium but feasibility isn't ensured off-equilibrium. The second contribution of this work is to demonstrate how the budget balance property can be added to a non-budget balanced mechanism without significant difficulty (at least in this setup). Contrary to [5] , [6] , [17] , the work here ensures full implementation of social welfare maximising allocation, so the designer can guarantee that only the most efficient outcome will be reached and no other (this kind of guarantee is substantially harder to make in a game-theoretic framework).
From a practical point of view, the work here establishes an upper bound on the number of signals required for implementation for the multicast problem. The agents here are only required to communicate via announcing demands and prices as opposed to generalised VCG mechanisms (refer to [1] , [2] , [18] , [19] or section 5.3 in [20] ), which are widely used but require announcement of pay-off types (entire valuation function in this case).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows -in Section II we state and characterise the solution of the Centralised problem that we wish to implement in a decentralised manner. In Section III we discuss the Weak and Strong Budget balance interpretations. In Section IV we describe and prove our mechanism for Weak Budget Balance case. In Section V we discuss relevant literature and some salient features of our mechanism. For lack of space, we have omitted proofs from here, for complete proofs and more discussion readers may refer to the technical report [15] .
II. CENTRALISED PROBLEM Formally, maximising social welfare will be defined via the centralised problem below.
Consider a set N of Internet agents who have been divided into disjoint groups (an agent is considered as a pair of source and destination users). The set of groups is denoted by K = {1, 2, . . . , K} and within a group k ∈ K, the set of agents by
The agents communicate over pre-specified routes on the Internet and the agents have been divided into groups based on the content they demand. While the content demanded by different groups is distinct, within a group all agents demand the same content but maybe at different rates. An allocation will be a vector x of rates which has K = |K| elements, each of which are themselves vectors of sizes G k , k ∈ K. For this denote by x ki ∈ R + (where R + is the set of non-negative real numbers) the rate allocated to agent i of group k, of the content demanded by group k (from here on we will refer to such an agent as agent ki). Agent's valuation for an allocation x can be written as
where v ki (·) : R + → R, for all ki ∈ N , which indicates that agent ki's satisfaction depends only on his information rate allocation x ki . Due to capacity constraints on the utilised links, allocation to agents is constrained by a number of inequality constraints -both on the network level as well as the group level.
Separate Routes and Notation
Each agent has a fixed pre-determined route. The route L ki of agent ki is the set of links that agent ki uses for his communication, and L = ∪ ki∈N L ki is the set of all available links. The set of agents utilising a link l ∈ L is defined as
, the set of agents from group k who use link l and K l is the set of groups that have at least one agent that uses link l i.e.
In addition to group-wise ordering of agents, we also have ordering of agents within the group for every link that is used by that agent. Any agent ki, on link l, will alternatively be also referred to as
Here the mapping is such that if for i, j ∈ G
. This is done to order agents in agroup separately at every link. Note that given the previous definitions, this notation is redundant; however we define it because it will be useful later on. Inverse mapping from ordering within a group and link will be denoted by (g l k ) −1 . The network administrator is interested in maximizing the social welfare under the link capacity constraints. This centralized problem is formally defined below.
and
Specifically, constraints C 2 are the inequality constraints on allocation, which as mentioned above, can be interpreted as capacity constraint for every link l ∈ L, in the network. In this interpretation α l kj would be representative of the QoS requirement of agent j combined with the specific architecture on link l. As an example, α
for all links l ∈ L kj , where l kj represents the packet error probability for link l for a packet encoded with channel coding rate R kj .
A. Assumptions
Our analysis would be done under the following assumptions.
(A1) For all agents, v ki (·) ∈ V ki , where the sets V ki are arbitrary subsets of V 0 , the set of all strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable functions R + → R with continuous second derivative. (A2) v ki (0) is finite ∀ ki ∈ N . This also implies that v ki (x) is finite and bounded ∀ ki and ∀ x since v ki 's are concave. (A3) Every link has at least two groups that use it, i.e.
(A4) The optimal solution of the centralised problem is such that on every link there are at least 2 groups such that each has at least one non-zero component, i.
(where x is the optimal solution of (CP)).
In addition, the coefficients are all strictly positive, i.e. α l ki > 0 ∀ l ∈ L ki , ∀ ki ∈ N . Also, for well-posedness of the problem we take c l > 0 ∀ l ∈ L. Assumption (A1) is made in order for the centralized problem to have a unique solution and for this solution to be sufficiently characterized by the KKT conditions. (A2) is a mild technical assumption that is required in the proof of Lemma IV.7. Assumption (A3) is made in order to avoid situations where there is a link constraint involving only one agent. Such case requires special handling in the design of the mechanism (since in such a case there is no contention at the link), and destructs from the basic idea that we want to communicate. Finally (A4) is related to (A3) and is made in order to simplify the exposition of the proposed mechanism, without having to define corner cases that are of minor importance.
B. Necessary and Sufficient Optimality conditions
Following are the KKT conditions, which are generally necessary, but in our case (due to all constraints being affine and strict concavity of v ki ) they will also be sufficient. For this we first rewrite the centralised problem by restating the capacity constraints differently
and α
Here the capacity constraints have been rewritten with the introduction of new variables. The virtual variables m l k represent the weighted maximum rate of group k on link l. It's easy to see that the solution of this problem is the same as the solution of the original one as far as optimal x is concerned. Now we define the Lagrangian for (CP)
Here KKT conditions will be written without explicitly referring to ν ki 's and just using the fact that ν ki ≥ 0 and ν ki x ki = 0 ∀ ki ∈ N . With the assumptions above, it's easy to see that the KKT conditions below will give rise to a unique x as the optimiser for (CP). KKT conditions: (a) Primal Feasibility:
Looking at (4), µ l ki will be non-zero only if α l ki x ki = m l k , so these can be interpreted as the "prices" for only those agents who receive maximum weighted allocation from a group at a given link. Consequently, from (5), λ l will be the sum of µ l ki over those agents in a group for whom it is non-zero and it is the same for all groups. λ l can be thought of as the common total price subject to each group at link l.
III. DIFFERENT FORMULATIONS OF THE CENTRALISED PROBLEM
The designer's task is to ensure that the above optimum allocation is made. This clearly requires the knowledge of v ki 's even when constraints C 1 , C 2 and C 3 are completely known. The premise of our problem is that we are dealing with agents who are strategic and for each of whom, the designer doesn't know their private information i.e. their valuation function v ki (·). One way forward for the designer could be to simply ask each agent to report their private information and announce the solution of (CP), with reported functions in place of v ki , for allocation. Apart from the fact that asking to report a function creates a practical communication problem, the main problem with this is that the agents could report untruthfully and end up getting a strictly better allocation. For example, reporting a v ki which has higher derivative than original at every point. In mechanism design terminology, as stated, the allocation function arising out of (CP) isn't even partially implementable 1 . Restricting ourselves to a certain class of utility functions (quasi-linear utilities), provides additional flexibility of penalising agents for reporting untruthfully by imposing taxes/subsidies. In this way, another related problem is created which is implementable, and which we will also show to be equivalent to (CP) as far as allocation is concerned. This leads us to the following additional assumption about agents' utilities (A5) All agents have quasi-linear utilities, i.e. we can write overall utility functions as
where in addition to allocation we have introduced taxes t (a vector like x).
Note that under assumption (A5), agent ki pays tax if t ki > 0 and receives a subsidy if t ki < 0. Taxes affect utilities linearly and overall utility itself is valuation after adjustment for taxes (total monetary representation of one's state of happiness).
Because we talk about social welfare as our main objective, the centralised problem (CP) isn't complete until we fix who owns the good that is being allocated. Then one will have to further check whether including their welfare in the objective function changes the optimum allocation. As it turns out, under the assumption of quasi-linear utilities and cost of providing the good being 0 for the owner, optimum doesn't change even if we involve the seller's welfare. In this regard, there are two interesting ways of reformulating (CP), as elaborated below.
A. First Reformulation of CP: Weak budget balance
We now introduce agent 0 as the owner of the good (called the seller). The seller doesn't have any costs for producing and providing the good, i.e. his valuation is the zero function. This could be interpreted as the good being already produced and ready to be provided, so those costs don't come into consideration for the seller as well as the designer. His utility is linear (since valuation is zero) and his revenue is the total tax paid by the agents, ki∈N t ki .
We define centralised problem (CP 1 ) as
s.t. C 1 and C 2 and C 3
where now, instead of just taking agent's valuations into account, we maximise the sum of their overall utilities, with the addition of seller's utility (which is only his revenue) -each agent pays a tax t ki , all of which goes to the seller, who has no valuation and therefore has utility equal to sum of taxes.
Anticipating that a rational seller will only sell if his revenue is non-negative we can add a weak budget balance (WBB) constraint, which states
B. Second Reformulation of CP: Strong budget balance
In this case, in contrast to (CP 1 ), there is no separate seller. We can alternatively say that the agents are themselves the owners of the good and are only looking to distribute the good (which they collectively own) in a way such that sum of utilities is maximised. Therefore strong budget balance (SBB) constraint is needed. This means that for the system N , no money has been introduced from the outside and the agents wish that no excess money remain on the table either.
The new centralised problem (CP 2 ) resulting from the above interpretation can be stated as
s.t. C 1 and C 2 and C 3 and
The two problems defined above will be shown to be equivalent to (CP) where since our original problem (CP) did not involve taxes, we will talk of equivalence only in terms of optimum allocation, x . Note that due to different conditions on taxes in the two, two different mechanisms will be needed to implement them.
It is straightforward to see that (CP 2 ) and (CP) are completely equivalent -due to constraint (SBB), the objective for (CP 2 ) is independent of t and is exactly the same as objective for (CP), with same remaining constraints. Now for (CP 1 ) and (CP 2 ), since the constraints on x are the same in (CP 1 ) and (CP 2 ) and the x−dependent part of the objective in (CP 2 ) in independent of t and is the same as the objective of (CP 1 ), we can see that (CP 1 ) and (CP 2 ) are equivalent. The two equivalences above automatically give the third one.
The above equivalences mean that not only will x be the same, but also that the necessary and sufficient conditions describing it will be the same i.e. KKT conditions, for x and λ , µ , will be exactly the same for all three problems (additionally we will show (WBB) and (SBB) constraints to be satisfied in respective formulations). This fact will be used in Section IV where the KKT conditions from Section II will be treated as if they have been written for (CP 1 ).
In Section IV, we will present a mechanism that fully implements (CP 1 ) in Nash Equilibria (NE). As mentioned before, treatment of (CP 2 ) is handled in the report [15] .
IV. A MECHANISM WITH WEAK BUDGET BALANCE
In this section we refer to (CP 1 ) as the centralised problem. So we have all the agents in N plus the seller and social welfare is in terms of everyone's utility (including seller's).
We will define a mechanism, in a way that doesn't require knowledge of v ki , whose game-form will have NE in pure strategies such that the allocation which corresponds to the equilibria of the game-form is same across all equilibria and is equal to the unique optimiser of (CP 1 ), x . In addition, the mechanism will be such that everyone involved (including the seller) will be weakly better-off at equilibrium than not participating at all.
A. Information assumptions
Assume that v ki (·) is a private information of agent ki, the mechanism designer doesn't know it but all agents know each other's private information (this is the complete information setup) 2 . Let I c be the set of common information between all agents, containing the information about full rationality of each agent. Finally, let I d be the knowledge of the designer, containing the information about constraints C 1 , C 2 , the fact that V ki ⊂ V 0 , ∀ ki ∈ N and that the seller has 0 valuation.
B. Mechanism
Formally, we have a set of environments V = × ki∈N V ki . We have seen from KKT, how each element of V can be mapped to an allocation x which maximises social welfare for that set of utilities. The allocation x achieves the maximum of (CP 1 ), and correspondingly any tax t satisfying (WBB) would do.
In our mechanism, the designer would define an action space S ki for each agent ki ∈ N . We denote S = × ki∈N S ki the set of action profiles for all agents. In addition the designer defines and announces the contract h : S → R N + × R N that maps every vector of messages received from the agents into an allocation vector and a tax vector (thinking of x, t as vectors with N = k∈K G k elements). The designer would then ask every agent ki ∈ N to choose a message from the set S ki based on which allocations (and taxes) would be made.
The seller is not asked to take any action, so as far as strategic decision making is concerned, we don't need to consider him any further. It is implicit in our mechanism in this section that when the tax t is imposed, the seller gets revenue (or utility) of ki∈N t ki .
Specifically, the designer would ask each agent to report
. This includes their demand for the good and the "price" for each constraint that they are involved, which they believe other(s) should pay. In this for every agent and link, there are two quoted pricesp . For received messages s = (s 11 , . . . , s 1N1 , . . . , s K1 , . . . , s KN K ) = (y, P, Q) = (y 11 , . . . , y KN K , p 11 . . . , p KN K ) the contract h ki (s) = (h x,ki (s), h t,ki (s)) will be defined for each ki ∈ N as follows.
If the received demand vector is y = (y 11 , . . . , y KN K ) = 0 then the allocation is x = (x 11 , . . . , x KN K ) = 0. Otherwise it is evaluated by first generating a scaling factor r through Using Nash equilibrium as solution concept
As mentioned before, Nash equilibrium as a solution concept applies to complete information games. Our motivation to use mechanism design for resource allocation on the Internet lied in the fact that the designer did not have the private information of Internet agents. So to assume that the players themselves have complete knowledge about each others' private information might be considered impractical. One justification used is that the mechanism is designed prior to agents' realising their private information, just like how a constitution designed a long time ago is still used years later. So the designer cannot know the private information of agents in advance. This in conjunction with the assumption that agents involved have a lot to lose or gain from the allocation (hence have an incentive to learn about private information others' separately) may form one instance of an Internet system where Nash equilibrium is a valid solution concept. Another justification is by interpreting NE as the outcome of a dynamic adjustment process, where players eventually learn enough about each other to converge to the Nash equilibrium action. Readers may refer to [25] for an exposition on the above mentioned dynamic adjustment argument and to [26] for learning methods used in game-theoretic setup.
Future research directions
We believe further investigation is needed into this problem. A very important research direction would be to look into the possible outcomes from a Bayesian framework and/or designing a new mechanism appropriate for this framework. One could also look into informational robustness of this mechanism itself.
